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DICTA

November, 1954

adopting a modern, rational method of procedure with the primary
object of seeking the truth rather than providing a larger playing
field for the practice of technical common law rules of evidence.
However, some progress has been made. In most of the states,
the courts permit the commissions to give probative weight to
hearsay if it is corroborated by some other evidence which would
indicate its trustworthiness. In Virginia and California, the courts
have left the probative value of hearsay in the discretion of the
Commission. Maryland has recognized that in certain cases hearsay may be sufficient to sustain an award.
From a review of the cases, it is clear that, hearsay does in
some instances have definite probative value often times sufficient
to sustain a claim. It would be erroneous to make an all inclusive
statement that hearsay is always incompetent or, on the other hand
that it always has probative weight.
Perhaps the answer lies in a clear, well-defined expression of
legislative intent permitting flexibility on the part of the tribunal
and leaving to their discretion the probative weight to be given
hearsay evidence. And if it is of the type that men of affairs customarily rely on in serious matters, an award based thereon would
be valid and within the requirements of due process.
The success of such a policy would be dependent on the experience and qualifications of the commissioners under the Act,
but in the end, so does justice in a court of law depend largely upon
the qualifications of the judges and attorneys who practice there.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
EVIDENCE: INCOMPETENCY v. INSUFFICIENCY-The recent decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in the case of Wheelock v. Lindner Packing Co.,1 deals with an elusive distinction between incompetency and insufficiency in the law of evidence. The
facts are not complicated. The plaintiffs delivered a shipment of
frozen meat to the carrier for delivery to Ft. Worth. The shipment
was refused by the receiver due to the spoiled condition of the
meat at the point of delivery. The plaintiffs disposed of the meat
at considerable loss and brought this action to recover damages.
The plaintiff established by competent evidence that the meat was
in proper condition upon delivery to the carrier, that the meat was
rejected at the point of delivery, and that it was subsequently sold
at a loss. Under the cases on interstate shipments, a shipper need
only prove that the goods were in proper condition when delivered
to the carrier and spoiled! when received. The burden then rests
upon the defendant carrier.
In the instant case, the plaintiff's only evidence as to the condition of the goods when received was clearly hearsay. This testiI-

Colo. -,

273 P. (2d) 730.
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mony was not objected to when given, but the fact of its being
hearsay was brought out during cross-examination. At the close
of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure
to prove a cause of action. The trial court ruled that the hearsay
would stand as evidence of the spoiled goods upon receipt. Since
the defendant offered no evidence to show lack of negligence the
judgment was given for the plaintiff.
In reversing the above judgment, the Supreme Court followed
a rule set out in Skinner & Andrews v. Satterfield,2 which held that
for purposes of a motion for directed verdict, a court should entirely disregard hearsay testimony whether objected to or not, and
that the rule applies as well to a motion to dismiss.
The Court held that the plaintiff fell short of proving the cause
for rejection of the goods by the receiver, but in so holding did not
state whether this was due to a lack of evidence entirely or to the
incompetency of the evidence presented. Certainly there was evidence, admittedly hearsay, but nevertheless part of the record due
to an untimely objection. This would appear to mean that hearsay
evidence even though sustained over an untimely objection, was
still incompetent for purposes of ruling on motion's for either a
directed verdict or dismissal. If this case does turn on competency
rather than the sufficiency of the evidence, then the distinction
narrows between this case and other cases holding that incompetent evidence unless objected to may be considered as a basis
for decision. 3
In stating that the plaintiff fell short of proving his cause of
action, the Court must be referring to the sufficiency of the evidence and not to its competency. This rule then would seem to
follow very closely the rule laid down in Hill v. Grosbeck,4 which
held that the failure of a party to object to the admissibility of
evidence does not preclude him from questioning its weight or
sufficiency when admitted to establish a fact in issue.
It would seem then that the Court is saying even though testimony of negligence and improper refrigeration was admitted without timely objection, its hearsay quality renders it insufficient in
weight to establish the facts it states.
J. BELKNAP

CIVIL PROCEDURE: ONLY THOSE PERSONS WHO ARE
NON-RESIDENTS AT THE TIME OF AN ACCIDENT MAY
BE SERVED THROUGH THE SECRETARY OF STATE: William Warwick v. The District Court of the City and County of
Denver, ____
Colo .... ,269 P. 2d 704, 1953-54 C.B.A., Adv. Sh. No. 12
p. 281.
This was an action for damages arising from an automobile
accident which occured March 7, 1951. On July 7, 1952, plaintiff
'121 Colo. 365, 216 P. (2d) 431.
'Woods v. $iegrist, 112 Colo. 257, 149 P. (2d)
29 Colo. 161, 67 P. 167.
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served process upon the Secretary of State in compliance with
section 48, chapter 16, '35 C.S.A., as amended by the Session Laws
of 1937, page 323, sections 1 to 4. Commonly known as the NonResident Motor Vehicle Statute, this statute provides for service
of process upon the Secretary of State, as the true and lawful
agent of any non-resident involved in an accident upon the public
highways of this State. Notice of the suit was given to the defendant in California, and the defendant appeared specially to
contest the validity of the service. In his affidavit the defendant
set forth the following facts: first, at the date of the accident, the
defendant was a resident of the City and County of Denver; second,
that he had moved to Colorado on October 9, 1950 and had remained
here until some time after the date of the accident; third, that his
contract of employment had subsequently terminated; and Fourth,
that he had moved from the state on March 21, 1951, in an effort
to find other employment. He further stated that he had filed both
the federal and state income taxes, giving his residence as Denver,
and that he had obtained both a 1951 automobile license and a 1951
operator's license in Colorado.
On these facts, the Court held: first, defendant was a bona
fide resident at the time of the accident, and, secondly, the Colorado
statute does not apply to that class of persons who are residents
of the State at the time of the accident.
The holding in this case is in accordance with the weight of
authority. In Carlson v. District Court of the City and County of
Denver,' a pastor of a church in Leadville, Colorado, was involved
in an automobile accident. By the time suit was commenced, he had
moved to New York. Taking judicial notice that pastors of necessity are moved about the country, the Court quashed the service
upon the Secretary of State. Where the person is not a nonresident at the time of the accident, service may not be had upon
him by means of the Colorado statute.
It was contended in Suit v. Shailer 2 that the term "non-resident" in a similar Maryland statute 3 referred to persons who were
non-residents at the time of the service of process. To this contention, the court replied, "... it was not the intention of the Maryland
Legislature to authorize this special form of substituted service on
defendants who were bona fide residents of the State at the time
of the occurrence, but who' '4afterwards changed their residence to
some other State or place.
Several cases involve military personnel who were stationed
in the State at the time of the accident, but who had been transferred by the time service of process was attempted. Uniformly,
the courts have held that, while the service men may have retained
their domicile in their home State, they were bona fide residents
' 116 Colo. 330, 180 P. (2d) 525 (1947).
'18 F. Supp. 568 (D. C. Md. 1937).
Flack's Supp. to the Ann. Code of Md., Art. 56, §190 A.
'Also, nc-te Wood v. White, 68 App. D. C. 341, 97 F. (2d)

646 (1938).
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of the State where the accident occurred. Therefore,
the statute
5
providing for substituted service was inapplicable.
Perhaps the most striking decision is Northwestern Mortgage
and Security Co. v. Noel Construction Co." One Carter intended to
abandon his residence in North Dakota. Without having made a
choice of new residence, he started on a visit to Minnesota. While
traveling in North Dakota, he was involved in an accident. After repairing his automobile, he continued his trip, never returning to
North Dakota, and finally taking up residence in the State of Washington. The North Dakota court held that Carter's residence at the
time of the accident was in North Dakota since he had not arrived
at his new residence. Therefore, jurisdiction over him could not be
gained 7by means of substituted service under the North Dakota
statute.
While not so extreme as the Northwestern case, other courts
have followed the general rule of these decisions.8
The only case which could be found which deviated from the
preceding decisions was State ex rel. Thompson v. District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District in and for Missoula County.9 This
statute differed from Colorado's in that it applied to "any person
who operates,"'10 and the court interpreted this to include those
who were residents at the time of the accident, but who subsequently became non-residents.
Under the majority of the present statutes, while it is possible
to obtain jurisdiction over present residents, and those who use
the public highways but who were never residents, it is not possible
to gain jurisdiction over one-time residents who move from the
state after an accident, but before start of suit.
Ten states 1have cured this defect in their statutes by making
their statutes specifically applicable to both non-residents, and to
residents who leave the State after an accident. 12 While the United
States Supreme Court has yet to decide the constitutionality of
these statutes, several state courts have held them valid. 13 Moreover, the basis for holding the statutes valid in cases of non-residents, i.e., the states' authority to regulate travel on public high5Berger v. Superior Court in and for Yuba County, 79 Cal. App. (2d) 425,
179 P. (2d) 600 (1947); Suit v. Shailer, si pra.
71 N. D. 256, 300 N. W. 28 (1941).
'North Dakota has since amended its statute to include such a class of
persons. See 1951 Session Laws of the State of N. D., section 28-0611, as amended
by 1953 Laws of N. D., chapter 204.
Welsh v. Ruopp, 228 Iowa 70, 289 N. W. 760 (1940); Mann v. Humphrey's
Adm'x, 257 Ky. 647, 79 S. W. (2d) 17 (1935).
'108 Mont. 362, 91 P. (2d) 422 (1939).
10 Revised Code of Mont.,
1947, Title 53, chapter 2, sections 201-206.
" Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
"Compare Ill. Rev. Stat., 1949, chapter 95%, section 22, with Minn. Stat.,
1945, section 170.55 (c), as amended by Laws of Minn., 1949, chapter 582.
"State ex rel. Thompson v. District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
in and for Missoula County, supra; Hendershot v. Ferkel, 140 0. St. 112, 56 N.
E. (2d) 205 (1944); Joseph Palozzolo'v. Harold J. MCord, 7 Ohio Op. 159 (1936).
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ways, 14 can with equal validity be applied to residents."'
It is submitted that in light of the decision in the principal
case, a similar amendment to Colorado's Non-Resident Motor
Vehicle Statute is needed to assure the residents of Colorado, damaged in automobile accidents, an opportunity to have their day in
the courts of their own jurisdiction.
JOHN CRISWELL
v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1915) ; Kane v. New Jersey, 242
274 U. S. 352 (1927).
U. S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski,
13.
15Hendershot v. Ferkel, supra, note
14 Hendrikick
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